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The Remote Causes of Affirmative
Action, or School Desegregation
in Kansas City, Missouri
Richard A. Epsteint
INTRODUCTION:

A TORT

GUIDE TO PUBLIC POLICY

In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur. In law, not the
remote but the proximate cause is to be observed. This quotation from
Bacon's Maxims is without doubt the origin of the modem tort doctrine
of proximate causation, by which we attribute certain harmful consequences to some prior wrongful act. The doctrine is often criticized
because the "nearest" cause need not be the exclusive cause or even the
dominant one. In spite of these substantive criticisms, Bacon's terminology continues to hold fast to the legal imagination against such
blander formulations as "legal cause" or "substantial factor."
Although the language of proximate cause might not capture all
the truths about problems of causation, it does capture at least one.
There comes a point at which it no longer makes sense to scour the
world for remote antecedents of particular harms. The further back one
goes, the less the map of causation will look like a river surging toward
the sea, and the more it will resemble a delicate network of capillaries
meandering toward a common destination, with no dominant beginning
or end. Concentrating on the "proximate" identifies the events likely
to have had the greatest impact. It is by focusing on these sources that
law and administration can exert the greatest control. One might look
to see if A made B hit C, but one will not conduct, at least within the
framework of litigation, a sociological inquiry into all the past influences that could have led the young A to perform an asocial act years
later. Thus, while we might peek past the proximate cause, we never
travel very far in tort down the road toward remote antecedents, and we
are all the better for the truncation of this causal journey.
A quick glance at the Supreme Court's decision last year in
Missouri v. Jenkins' (Jenkins III) reveals that no such principle of
Copyright © 1996 California Law Review, Inc.
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prudence reigns in the de jure school desegregation cases still before the
Court over forty years after Brown v. Board of Education.2 In an age
when pressing educational problems are everywhere around us, time has
stood still for the federal courts that heroically struggle to eliminate the
"last vestiges" of segregation by remedies that have become at once
more draconian, unfocused, and futile as the years creak by. The
purpose of this short Article is to deplore this remedial trend and to
urge the Supreme Court to abandon now the hapless search for legal
remedies for the remote causes of a present unpalatable state of affairs.
The process of mending-or ending-public education should be
conducted by fashioning the best responses we can to the challenges the
system now faces, without being deflected by a misguided search for the
rectification of past wrongs.'
At first it may appear odd that such a plea should appear in an issue of the California Law Review devoted to the contentious topic of
affirmative action. But the linkage between desegregation and affirmative action is quite close. The standard principles of equity preach that
for every wrong there ought to be a remedy. Yet by the same token,
equity demands that the remedy be limited to the wrong created. The
remedy should impose duties only on the wrongdoer and offer its benefits only to the injured parties, and only for the wrong suffered. Just as
it is inappropriate to leave some injuries unredressed, so too is it improper to impose remedies that go beyond the scope of the original
wrong. If S refuses to convey Blackacre to B, B's remedy is against S
for specific performance of Blackacre. While interim damages could be
added to make up for the time loss, an order to convey Whiteacre along
with Blackacre would be condemned as a form of judicial overreaching.
Excessive remedies, like inadequate remedies, are to be avoided.
The school desegregation cases are far more ambitious in their
scope than an ordinary dispute over nonperformance of a land sale
contract, but the same principles apply. A remedy that leaves some
portion of the past wrong unredressed is inadequate. A remedy that
provides relief for wrongs that have not been committed is excessive.
Inadvertent errors are surely par for the course, and if a court is faced
with a choice between doing too much and doing too little, it may be
forgiven, and perhaps commended, if it errs on the side of the innocent
party. Nevertheless, sometimes proposed remedies are so excessive they
cannot be justified as rectification of past wrongs. When we do not have
the original wrongdoer or the original victim before the court, and when
remedies are imposed on innocent parties for the benefit of other inno2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. For evidence of the decline in educational standards, see Sam Peltzman, The Political
Economy of the Decline of American Public Education, 36 J.L. & EcON. 331 (1993).
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cent parties, then the judicial apparatus has lost sight of the equitable
principles that govern its remedial powers.
In the context of segregation, if the remedy is no longer tailored to
acts of past discrimination, it can no longer be justified by any theory of
rectification. In deed, but not in word, the remedy begins to resemble a
system of affirmative action--covert and imprecise, to be sure, but affirmative action nonetheless. Just this progression is evident in Jenkins
III. The preferences do not run lock-step on racial lines; some .whites,
as well as some blacks, benefit from the program. But this muddying of
the waters is best understood as a halfway house providing refuge from
the fierce political and judicial resistance that would accompany a bald
and unambiguous affirmative action program.4
This backing and filling is not uncommon. The complex scheme
of bidding preferences in the Small Business Act, for example, manifests this same kind of ambivalence. Congress sensed the difficulty in
creating a program that simply gives preferences to minorities and
women. However, it could not give up on the idea altogether, so it
scraped together a compromise that also gives other disadvantaged individuals some, but not quite as much, preference over white males. The
result is a sprawling and inconclusive Supreme Court decision in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,6 whose zigs and zags defy easy
summarization.
The orders in dispute in Jenkins III have their origin in litigation
and not legislation, but they twist and turn like the legislative creations
that introduce quasi-affirmative action programs. So desperate are the
judges in Kansas City to do something about the situation in public
education that they falsely link all present maladies to actions that took
place two generations ago. This form of judicial heroism carries with it
a hefty price tag, for it is immediately evident that no contemporary defense can be offered for the spending and management decisions in the
district court's proposed order.7 The bottom line is that the federal
courts have taken control of state and local budgets and are making
management decisions in complete disregard of the considerations that
would properly be taken into account by a responsible school board.
This Article argues that the remedial orders of the district court are
really nothing more than components of a poorly tailored affirmative
action program. Part I gives an overview of the lengthy litigation that
4. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, Nos. 94-50569, 94-50664, 1996 WL 120235, at *26 (5th Cir.
Mar. 18, 1996) (restricting the use of racial preferences in the admissions program of the University
of Texas School of Law).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-656 (1994).
6. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
7. For the decisions below, see Jenkins v. Missouri, 13 F.3d 1170 (8th Cir. 1993); Jenkins v.
Missouri, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993).
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has led to this latest Supreme Court decision. Part II briefly demonstrates the sharp differences between judicial management and the forward-looking administration of public schools.
It does so by
contrasting the work of a district court judge in fashioning a
"remedial" school desegregation plan with that of a hypothetical private consultant, hired to improve school performance in one district
without hurting schools elsewhere in the state. Part iI then examines
the four components of the district court's remedial plan in Jenkins. At
the most fundamental level, I argue that the entire remedial enterprise is
flawed because it is no longer possible to identify either victims or
wrongdoers. Because the Supreme Court remains willing to tolerate
such a loose connection between today's remedy and yesterday's remote wrong, its response in Jenkins III was too timid to curb the endless
litigation and remedial excess that has arisen in the afterglow of Brown.
Finally, in Part IV, I argue that the "remedial" plan at issue in the
Jenkins litigation is really no more than a thinly veiled and unjustifiable
affirmative action program.
The original draft of this article was written without the benefit of
John Choon Yoo's excellent contribution to this symposium,8 which
also critiques the decision in Jenkins III on the ground that the courts
have placed far too much reliance on the structural injunction to correct
the ostensible sins that are found, not only in the school desegregation
cases, but also in such areas as prison reform, mental health, and housing. His arguments dovetail closely with my own, but differ from them
in focus and emphasis. My dominant concern is less with the inherent
power of courts of equity to enter structural decrees, and more with the
advisability of using such decrees to remedy wrongs whose active commission ceased a long time ago. My analysis tracks that of Yoo in
stressing the difficulties of finding the status quo ante to which some
equitable decree should seek to return.9 But it offers no general critique
of structural injunctions as they apply in other contexts.
It is possible, therefore, to defend the general use of structural
injunctions for recent or ongoing wrongs, while deploring their use-as
well as the use of damage actions or other forms of remedial relief-to
handle the sins of past generations. I avoid taking a position on
structural injunctions generally, or on their relationship to federalism
and the Tenth Amendment, the scope of the judicial power under
Article I, or the doctrine of separation of power-the issues that
occupy so much of Yoo's paper.10 Rather, I have confined my criticism
8. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor'sFoot?: The Inherent Remedial Authority
of the FederalCourts, 84 CALIF. L REv. 1121 (1996).
9. Id. at 1137-41.
10. Id. at 1141-66.
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to use of the structural injunction in the context of de jure segregation
that ceased when Brown became the law. Stated otherwise, my difficulties with the injunction are substantive, not structural, for I would be
as much opposed to its use in this context if it were implemented by the
Missouri state courts as by the Supreme Court. But I do not think it just
a matter of coincidence that the Jenkins saga has been staged from first
to last in the federal courts.
I
A

LONGISH CASE HISTORY

In order to put Jenkins III in perspective, it is necessary to recall a
few of the major benchmarks of American history. As Justice Ginsburg
notes, the black codes were introduced in the early 1700s." The Constitution, with the Three-Fifths Clause, was adopted in 1787. The Civil
War ended in 1865. The Reconstruction Amendments were adopted in
1868. Reconstruction itself ended in 1877, and some semblance of integration was preserved in the South until the 1890s, when populist radicals were able to wrest control of local political bodies and impose Jim
Crow. Segregation became the norm, with segregated trains and buses,
anti-miscegenation laws, and of course, segregated schools. The entire
program was held to be within the scope of the state police power in
Plessy v. Ferguson,2 which was decided in 1896.
The scope of segregation, especially in education, was not confined
to public schools; nor was it confined to the South. Many border and
northern states maintained some form of segregation until the end of
World War II. Thus, it must never be forgotten that the first of the
named defendants in Brown v. Board of Education was the Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas. Without question, Kansas City, Missouri
segregated schools by race until 1954, when the system was disbanded
in the wake of Brown. Some ten years later Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.13 This epic lawsuit began in 1977, when the Kansas
City, Missouri School District (KCMSD), the school board and the children of two school board members-no coincidence here!-brought
suit against the State of Missouri and against surrounding suburban
school districts (SSDs), seeking relief from the lingering effects of racial
segregation. 4
The Jenkins litigation began twenty-three years after Brown and
has continued for nineteen years more. It shows no signs of letting up,
11. Jenkins 111, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1994).
14. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (JenkinsII); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274
(1989) (Jenkins 1).
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for in Jenkins III the Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration with strict instructions as to the permissible scope of possible
remedies. The prior procedural history of the case can only be described as tortured: 5 the initial trial lasted some seven and one-half
months, and resulted in a verdict that dismissed all claims against the
suburban defendants and the federal government. However, the State of
Missouri was found to be in violation of Brown insofar as it had segregated its students before 1954, and had thereafter taken tepid and insufficient steps to eliminate the vestiges of segregation.16
One year later, the district court issued its remedial order, whose
stated goal was the "elimination of all vestiges of state imposed segregation."17 The district court noted the high concentration of black students (68.3%) in the KCMSD, and that twenty-five of its sixty-eight
schools had black enrollments of over 90%. The district court further
determined that the harm suffered as a result of the original breach of
duty was a reduction in overall student achievement levels within the
KCMSD. However, it never attempted to explain what portion of the
below-level.achievement was attributable to prior segregation, and what
portion to other causes of more recent origin. Consistent with its view
of the case, the district court then ordered an extensive remedial educational program with the goal of improving every area of operations
within the KCMSD. Its ultimate aspiration was to restore the KCMSD to
a AAA classification, the highest awarded by Missouri's State Board of
Education. The district court ordered a reduction in class size, full-day
kindergarten and expanded summer school, before- and after-school
tutoring, and an early childhood development program. By any standard measurement, the resources poured into the KCMSD far exceeded
those necessary to meet the AAA standard. They also exceeded by far
the level of resources available in the wealthiest suburban school district
in the state. The cumulative capital budget for the KCMSD was $260
million as of 1990, and rose, as of the date of Jenkins III, to over $540
million.'8 The per-pupil expenditures, excluding these capital costs,
were $9,412 per pupil, the price of a hefty private school tuition, while
the comparable figures for the SSDs varied from $2,854 to $5,956.19
The district court did not confine its remedial labors to educational
programs, which almost by definition could not alter the racial composition of the KCMSD. Since no suburban school districts were in violation of their constitutional obligations, the Supreme Court's key prior
15.
16.
17.
1986).
18.
19.

For the Court's summary of the history, see Jenkins II1, 115 S.Ct. at 2042-45.
Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1505-06 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affid, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir.
Jenkins 111, 115 S. Ct. at 2044.
Id. at 2054.
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decision in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1) blocked the district court
from conscripting them into participation in an interdistrict remedy. To
skirt the prohibitions of Milliken I, the district court proposed building
magnet schools inside the city, in order to attract white students from the
suburbs and produce racial balance. In addition, the district court ordered an intensive program of capital improvements aimed at making
the schools' physical environment more appealing to suburban students-in other words, to improve the "desegregative attractiveness" of
the KCMSD. The original plan called for the creation of a veritable
Land of Oz:
high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning,
an alarm system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot
planetarium; green houses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an
air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United
Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio
and television studios with an editing and animation lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and screening
rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room;
1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a
zoo project; swimming pools; and numerous other facilities.2
Finally, the plan called for increases in teachers' salaries, with the
purpose of attracting and keeping the best faculty and thereby further
promoting the schools' "desegregative attractiveness."
The district court adopted this multi-pronged remedy on the
ground that the KCMSD had failed to desegregate its schools after
Brown. As long as some vestige of past discrimination remained discernible, the Court would reserve full equitable powers and the management of Kansas City's schools would be essentially backwardlooking and remedial in nature. Only when the KCMSD came into full
compliance would the focus on past wrongs in the making of management decisions for the school district come to an end.'
In Jenkins III, the Supreme Court rebuffed the district court in
three ways. First, it held that the creation of magnet schools in order to
attract suburban students was not an appropriate remedy for past segregation within the KCMSD. The only wrongs that the district court identified took place inside the KCMSD, and there was no showing that the
segregative effects of these violations had influenced official patterns of
20. 418 U.S. 717,748-53 (1974).
21. Jenkins III, 115 S. Ct. at 2044-45 (quoting Jenkins II, 495 U.S. at 77 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992) (setting out the factors under which a court's
22. See Freeman v. Pitts,
supervision could end). But the emphasis on full compliance and good faith commitment to the
enforcement of the Court's decree means that there is never any fixed termination to post-Brown
remedial proceedings.
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behavior in other districts. Just as the Court could not enlist the SSDs in
an integration remedy, so it could not cure intra-KCMSD violations by
luring suburban students into the district. Next, the Supreme Court held
that the across-the-board salary increases were also inappropriate; they,
too, were implemented to promote "desegregative attractiveness," and
thus were not remedies tied to the commission of a localized wrong.
And finally, the Supreme Court rejected the district court's standard of
compliance: the Court could not require that the KCMSD's students
test at or above national norms as the prerequisite for terminating judi-

cial supervision.2?
II
LAW VERSUS MANAGEMENT

Jenkins III revealed the deep intellectual and ideological splits inside the Supreme Court. The heated skirmishes among the justices were
motivated by strong differences in attitudes among the justices toward
remedial relief for remote wrongs. The majority of five was tired of
once again having to review a case that had dragged on for eighteen
years without conclusion. While fatigue was the dominant impulse on
the Court, Justice Souter in dissent expressed a different brand of impatience: he had had enough of what he perceived as the nonstop bad
faith of the KCMSD from the outset of the litigation. 4
For all its passion, however, this dispute misses the mark by continuing to focus on the kind of remedies the district court should have
adopted. It deals with midcourse corrections, not fundamental changes
in direction. In this short essay, I want to sidestep this debate and pose a
more dramatic question: why countenance any continuing remedies at
all? In my view, it is high time to call a halt to costly and unproductive
judicial efforts to rectify remote injustices. Those efforts have failed by
any measure that one could bring to bear on them. The time has come
to focus solely on the future and to curb the remedial exuberance of the
federal courts. Throughout this litigation, the district court has arrogated the power to initiate government action, irrespective of any collateral social and financial consequences. It is time to stop it.
In making this plea, I do not rely on some categorical imperative
that admits of the necessity of judicial restraint. The whole debate between activism and restraint does little to decide concrete cases litigated
under specific clauses of the Constitution. These doctrines create, at
most, only a weak presumption for courts charged with passing on the
23. Jenkins 111, 115 S. Ct. at 2055-56.
24. Id. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("After Brown, neither the State nor the KCMSD moved
to dismantle this system of separate education 'root and branch' despite their affirmative obligation to
do that under the Constitution.") (citations omitted).
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constitutionality of legislative actions. However, even the extensive judicial intervention that I champion on First and Fifth Amendment matters
never requires, or even allows, the Court to initiate government action.
Protecting freedom of speech requires only that the courts nullify legislative initiatives that limit speech. Similarly, extensive judicial oversight of takings should prevent some government misadventures from
getting off the ground. A taking may be barred because it is not made
for public use, or enjoined until the compensation owing is paid; however, even the most aggressive reading of the Takings Clause does not
authorize courts to order the legislature to condemn this parcel of land
for a post office and that one for a fort. Initiating government action is
entrusted exclusively to the legislature. The desegregation cases thus
undertake what even the most aggressive advocates of speech and property rights never dare contemplate. Post-Brown jurisprudence ignores
the limits on what should go into a court's equitable tool-kit; it equips
the judiciary with a power of initiation and management that is ill-suited
to its institutional capabilities and that ultimately leads to counterproductive social results. Running public schools is not a job for the federal courts.
To see the powerful contrast between retrospective judicial control
and effective remedial administration, suppose the original Jenkins lawsuit had never been filed, but the KCMSD still sought to improve the
lackluster performance of its schools. In order to achieve this goal, it
hires you as its consultant and charges you with improving school performance in Kansas City, without hurting too much schools elsewhere in
the state. Your mission is not to mull over the past, but to set a responsible course for the future. This charge first recognizes the primary
educational mission in Kansas City, but also the interconnection between
the KCMSD and other school districts in the state. The basic state-wide
budget constraint cannot be wished away: money spent in one locale
cannot be spent in another. Public officials cannot tap any hidden cornucopia to fund their most treasured projects. Like the rest of us, they
live in a world of scarcity and constraint.
How would you respond to this plum assignment? Surely you
would familiarize yourself with the history, operations, and resources of
the KCMSD. What is the current racial composition of its student body
and faculty? How did it get that way? What programs have succeeded?
Which have failed? How does recruitment take place? What could be
done to improve it? What, if anything, is the correlation between educational investment and achievement? How, if at all, could parents play a
role in school functions? What response, if any, has been taken or
should be taken toward union demands? The menu of items is long.
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Your aim would be to devise a program that makes incremental but
lasting improvements in the operation of the system.
What is striking, in contrast to the judicial approach, is the relative
weight you would attach to recent and remote events. Of course, distant
causes are not irrelevant, and immediate ones are not decisive; your task
would not require you to proceed in accordance with Sir Francis Bacon's maxim on proximate causation. Sound management principles,
however, would lead you to weigh immediate causes more heavily than
remote ones. Quite simply, recent events are more likely to have a potent impact on the current situation. Events surrounding 1954-to pick
a date not quite at random-are unlikely to explain much about what
should be done here and now. Stated bluntly, you would not find the
key to the KCMSD's current dilemmas in the misdeeds of the dead, defunct, and departed of two generations ago. As a consultant, you would
trade one cost against another, one benefit against another, and then
make marginal adjustments in system operations. You would consider a
set of well-thought-out hunches and try to make matters better at a reasonable cost. Unlike a desegregation court, you would not adhere to
one fixed point before which everything else must yield. Proper management of a school district is a hit-or-miss business, with no single
controlling objective and no single dominant constraint.
III
WHAT REMEDIES?

Such forward-looking management highlights four remedial inconsistencies that quite literally jump off the pages of Jenkins III. The
first is the unattainable ideal of perfect rectification of past wrongs for
which the desegregation courts strive. The second is the impossibility of
fashioning remedies when both victims and wrongdoers have long since
parted from the scene. The third is the Supreme Court's response to the
outsized salary increases the district court ordered for KCMSD teachers.
The fourth is Jenkins III's rejection of national norms of student performance as a benchmark for determining when the vestiges of segregation have been eliminated within the KCMSD. Each of these issues
brings into question the "remedial" nature of the district court's actions. The Supreme Court's treatment of the last two issues was far better than its treatment of the first two because it brought to them a
skepticism which the entire Jenkins venture deserves. As will be seen,
however, the Court's performance would improve markedly across the
board if it dislodged the district court from its managerial perch.
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A. The False Hope of Perfect Rectification
After this brief description, it is useful to recall that the long-lost
objective of the original lawsuit was to undo the last vestiges of segregation. The district court's goal is not to restore the system to the position
that it was in forty years ago, but rather to create what would exist today
had the original wrongs never been committed. To use the Supreme
Court's own words, a desegregation remedy "is necessarily designed, as
all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct."'
The ideal is rectification. The remedy is an effort to undo the status
quo ante even though time has marched on inexorably for two generations. For several reasons, this expectation standard is the wrong way to
think about the problem.
First, the above passage implies that the law of remedies for even
the most sprawling and complicated of public disputes takes its cue
from the private law of remedies. The Court's standard is the expectation measure of damages, which seeks to place the innocent plaintiff in
exactly the same position she would have enjoyed had the defendant
performed his promises to the letter. While this standard is invoked as a
kind of necessary truth, the limitations that apply to it in the private law
context are ignored. One common limitation is that no coercive remedy
may be imposed when it has adverse consequences on third parties. For
example, specific performance is not ordered for a contract to buy or
sell real estate if it would destroy a third party's lien. Jenkins' ambitious equitable interventions are shot through with adverse consequences
for innocent persons. Third parties outside the district are forced to
contribute to the court order's support, while innocents within the district are inconvenienced by its command. Indeed, virtually the entire
burden of the district court's remedy falls on parties in no way connected to the original wrong. The protection of third parties has been
disregarded by the peculiar version of equity practiced in the desegregation cases.
A similar fate has befallen the traditional understanding that it is
not always possible to put the innocent plaintiff back in the position she
would have enjoyed absent the breach. The formal ideal of perfect rectification requires one to reconstruct the past out of whole cloth and is
often recognized as unattainable in ordinary contract disputes. 26 Parties
frequently substitute liquidated damages provisions for expectation
25. Id. at 2048 (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746).
26. The leading statement of the standard view is found in L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr.,
The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages, 46 YALE LJ.52 (1936). For my own criticism, see
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 1
LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989).
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damages to obviate the need for reconstructing "what might have
been," even on a small compass. Courts also recognize that speculative
damages are often simply not recoverable. Events need not follow just
one course in the absence of a breach; other decisions could intervene,
and other contracts could be breached. Just as today's occurrence cannot be traced to a single wrong of years ago, so a single scenario cannot
describe all that may have flowed from a determinate past wrong. When
calculating "what would have been" becomes too speculative, contract
doctrine eschews the expectation standard in favor of reliance and restitution damages. The strong legal preference for avoiding speculative
damages has been abandoned in the desegregation cases.
The Court's ideal of perfect restoration also suggests that specific
performance should be the remedy of choice, as damages never quite
get the job done. In the private law of remedies, other considerations
often intervene, including the ability of a court to supervise the remedies
it imposes. For example, specific performance may be available for
failure to convey land to which a defendant has clear title: once the
deed is delivered, the court's work is done. But this remedy falters noticeably in the employment context, where the continuous task of supervision requires more intensive judicial monitoring. Rather than trying
to make hostile parties work together, a common law court will usually
accept a parting of the ways as the better solution. Damages-often liquidated as a multiple of salary, for example, one month's pay for each
year served-give a superior remedy that obviates the need for daily
intrusions into the workplace. Yet employment disputes are small potatoes compared to the endless system-wide problems of supervision
created by judicial management of a major school district. The remedies in Jenkins III go far beyond those imposed in private disputes. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's statement as to the restorative function
of all remedies captures an unattainable ideal, not a plausible result.
One reason for the Court's error is that in its pursuit of hopeless
ideals it has forgotten that any sensible remedy is effectively constrained
by the principle of diminishing marginal utility. Desegregation cases
are not exempt from this rule. The first corrective steps after Brown v.
Board of Education were easy to implement: terminate the system of
explicit segregation and move to residence-based school districts. These
two steps could not correct all injustices, but what they did accomplish
was important and lasting progress, achieved cheaply and effectively.
However, the further down the remedial trail one moves, the greater the
risk that the next specific remedy will be under- or over-inclusive.
Jenkins' effort to avoid the first error, moving too slowly on desegregation, carries with it the usual consequence: excessive remedial action.
Once official segregation has been uprooted, further remedies necessar-
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ily veer toward over-inclusion. The only way to ferret out the last vestiges of segregation is to repudiate many practices that involve no discrimination at all. In a sprawling desegregation suit, no court can direct
its remedial laser beam to a clearly defined set of past wrongs. The
remedies chosen respond not only to problems attributable to past segregation, but also to the structural, administrative, parental, and neighborhood failures of the last forty years. The longer the gap between
now and the identified wrong, the lower the returns to continued judicial
intervention and the greater the risk that any remedy will be excessive.
B. Neither Victims nor Wrongdoers
The ordinary tort action presupposes that a suit is brought by the
victim of a wrong against the wrongdoer, but in Jenkins III no such
linkage between the parties can be found. Starting with the victims'
side, the Court needs to be able to identify the "victims" protected by a
desegregation order. But while the categories of victims can be stated
fairly broadly, almost none of the current beneficiaries of the plan fall
into even the most capacious definition of the injured class. The obvious victims of past segregation are the children who were educated in
segregated schools. Secondary victims might include their families.
Finally, victims just might include any descendants of these individuals
whose own life chances were reduced by the lower incomes of their parents.
Unfortunately, the program in Jenkins III targets a different class
of persons, namely all families whose children attend school in Kansas
City today. That class of persons has some overlap with the families
prejudiced forty years ago, but surely not much. The most obvious difference is that the percentage of black students in Kansas City schools in
1954 was under twenty percent, while in 1995 it came close to seventy
percent. Much of this difference in racial composition comes from inmigration that, far from being the consequence of early official discrimination, is a response to the lavish programs and facilities offered to
induce individuals of all races to move into the district. Why these outsiders should receive largesse for unrelated wrongs committed to other
persons long dead and gone is anyone's guess. The Court defines victims by location and by race. These designations, however, carry with
them no independent moral weight; they must serve as proxies for some
tangible harm from wrongful state practices. Yet black families who
moved to Kansas City in 1990 are hardly the victims of wrongful acts
directed toward other residents over thirty years before.
The Court is no better at identifying the putative wrongdoers. It
never explains why any duty to rectify runs toward the white citizens of
today's Kansas City, who are no more responsible for past segregation
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in the district than the white and black citizens elsewhere in the state who
are asked to foot the bill. Any continuity of interest between the group
of past wrongdoers and the present defendants is wholly lacking. The
only reason for holding the present parties accountable for past segregation is that they are conveniently available when the actual wrongdoers are not. It is not as though earlier victims assigned some imaginary
set of remedial rights to persons who moved into the district years after
they left. Similarly, it is not as though present shareholders of a corporation are being asked to answer for wrongs committed before they purchased their shares. There is, in short, no glue to bind today's citizens
to yesterday's wrong.
Justice O'Connor blinked just a bit when she acknowledged that
the remedial order for the KCMSD conferred benefits on "some who
did not suffer under-and, indeed, may have even profited from-past
segregation."2' 7 Shrugging the point off, she gamely continued by
stating that "[t]here is no categorical constitutional prohibition on nonvictims enjoying the collateral, incidental benefits of a remedial plan
designed 'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.'"2 Yet
the issue of spillover effects is far more acute than this passage suggests.
This is not a case where recovery by victims necessitated some relief to
persons outside the target class. On the contrary, all of the victims have
graduated, and most of their descendants have scattered to the four
winds. The spillover effects of this plan are not collateral. Aid to nonvictims is the only thing that the Court's remedy really accomplishes.
An inquiry into the identity of the victims and wrongdoers also
calls into question the basic structure of the Court's distinction between
inter- and intra-district remedies. For the Court, this line proves durable
because the wrongs committed inside the district do not justify burdening those outside of it with an integration remedy.29 This distinction
would make sense if the Court could explain why the remedial harms
should be visited on white families who live within the KCMSD. It cannot. The same reasoning that bars interdistrict relief for an intradistrict
violation-that remedial burdens should be imposed only on those persons involved in the original harm-should also bar the intradistrict
remedy of Jenkins III.
It is for this reason that we should reject the different spin that Justice Souter places on the observation that it is no longer possible to determine whether the white flight from Kansas City is attributable to past

27.
28.
29.

Jenkins 111, 115 S. Ct. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746).
Id. at 2048-54.
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segregation or the current efforts at integration.30 He is justified in observing that the inability to disentangle the remote causes of the present
situation renders unworkable the traditional causal inquiries. But he
then jumps in the wrong direction by urging the expansion of judicial
receivership, when it is in fact imperative to scuttle the entire futile effort
at judicial management.
In rejecting Justice Souter's position, the Court thus makes a good
start, excluding from the district court's remedial web the extra-district
parties whose connection to the harm is too remote. Unfortunately, it
stops short by drawing an arbitrary distinction between those individuals
who live inside the district and those who live outside its borders. The
dissent may have thought that the lack of a relevant distinction justified
imposing duties on both. The better course of action is to impose those
remedies on neither.
Systematically viewed, the vice in this case is not that resources were
spent to lure students into the KCMSD from regions that did not practice discrimination. Rather, it lies in the idea that any reference should
be made to the wrongs of 1954 in order to answer the question of how
educational resources should be allocated today. The Court's position
may look conservative in comparison to the dissent's, which sees no
harm in inter-district magnets under the Milliken decisions so long as no
coercion is imposed on outsiders." But the Court's position does not
bring this lawsuit to an end: it only sends it back for yet another round
of litigation below, where once again the wrong ends will be pursued by
the wrong techniques.
We have long passed the time when corrections at an institutional
level bear any relationship to the commission of any wrong to any individual victim. The local entities are no longer an effective proxy for
the individuals who were benefited or burdened by past violations. The
Court's reasoning retains some plausibility only because it refuses to
pierce the municipal veil to see what persons are actually hurt and what
persons are helped by its actions. Statements about the welfare of
corporations and partnerships are necessarily statements about the welfare of their members. The same methodological caveat also applies to
local governments: when a court directs its firepower against an
organization, it is in fact acting against those who are presently its
members. Far from having a fixed membership, however, local entities
have permeable boundaries and migratory populations. The residents
of a school district today are not the heirs or assigns of the people who
lived there forty years ago. Thus, the minimum conditions of a theory

30.
31.

Id. at 2084-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2088-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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of corrective justice are not satisfied, even if desegregation remedies are
limited to the place-not the persons-where the wrong was committed.
C. More Money for What End?
The Court's performance improved markedly when it worked itself
into a more skeptical frame of mind. In particular, it did far better in
questioning why there should be greater teacher salary increases in the
KCMSD than elsewhere in the state. I can think of no good reason. It
is, of course, no accident that the city teachers' union was strongly in
favor of the raises. 2 An increase in teachers' salaries elevates the wages
of existing teachers from competitive to monopoly rates, or, more precisely, from relatively competitive to more monopolistic rates, without
any improvement in overall teaching performance within the district.
Any correlation between teachers' salaries and student performance is
tenuous at best. What may well be needed is the aggressive recruitment
of good teachers, a measure that is very likely blocked by a union seniority system that protects teachers with long years of service, while
keeping out newer teachers who might actually make a difference. If
forced to choose between a desegregation remedy that banned the union and one that raised the wages of its members, I would without hesitation pick the former over the latter. Why an increase in salary to
present teachers rectifies the wrongs to a past generation of students is
anyone's guess.
The wage increases go only towards collateral purposes. The lower
court thought increased salaries would prevent white-flight, but the Supreme Court held that preventing white-flight was not a legitimate object
of the decree. The salary increases could also be justified as a response
to current disamenities in teaching in inner-city schools with predominantly black populations. Those difficult and perhaps dangerous circumstances could easily require some form of a wage premium. Such a
premium, however, would bear no relationship to the prior wrong.
Rather, the need is created by the breakdown of discipline in modern
education, a problem that postdates the fall of segregation and has its
origins in the breakdown of the family and in the increasingly percussive nature of popular culture, or so one could argue. The more time
that passes, the more likely it becomes that teachers' salaries are responding to forces that did not surface prior to Brown. The need for
the wage increment may be strong, but it can hardly be traced to the
wrong supposedly being remedied. And for all we know, the needs
32.

Id. at 2046 (noting the efforts of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) to obtain the

raises and bypass the collective bargaining process).

It is interesting that none of the proposed

remedies would limit the power of the AFT in order to strengthen the ability of the system to serve
students' needs.
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could be as acute in some regions of St. Louis as they are in Kansas
City. But the proper response, again, is not to insist that the remedy be
narrowly tailored to distant and increasingly irrelevant wrongs. 3 Rather,
it is to jettison the entire process of remedial litigation, and allow management of the schools to be frankly tailored to current needs.
D. PerpetualNoncompliance
The constant mantra of Jenkins III is that judicial supervision is
required until the last vestiges of segregation are rooted out from the
system. Stating the proposition in this way speaks volumes about the
riskiness of desegregation litigation. Directing the court's remedial machinery at 1954 guarantees that problems of multiple causation will
only grow more acute with the passage of time. As the violation recedes
into the past, other phenomena start to contribute more substantially to
the KCMSD's desperate condition. However, as long as some fraction
of the problem is attributable to the remote wrongs, then the full set of
judicial sanctions remains in place. To a cynic, the direction in which
these sanctions lead is unmistakable. If the last vestiges of segregation
have not been removed in 40 years, why suppose they will be removed
in 100 years? The attenuated theories of causation that have allowed the
lawsuit to travel thus far have not exhausted their power. If these weak
links between past wrongs and present conditions are adequate today,
when will the court ever be willing to withdraw from its supervisory
role? The upshot is that, having once been segregated, a school district
is always subject to judicial supervision.
Stated in this gross form, the outcome was not acceptable even to
the district court. The standard that it ultimately adopted recognized the
formal possibility that supervision could end, but at the same time made
it highly unlikely that this desirable outcome could ever be achieved.
More concretely, the district court held that the effects of past segregation were not eliminated, and thus remedial intervention would continue,
as long as student achievement levels were still "at or below national
norms at many grade levels."34 The introduction of this benchmark
into the remedial calculus once again demonstrates the perils of an unfettered definition of proximate causation. The most obvious point is
that all students in KCMSD were not victims of segregation, so their test
scores are not evidence of a continuing harm even under a generous test
of remediation. But even were one to assume that all students were victims, the district court established the wrong standard. The relevant
control group is not all students in the United States, but rather those
33.

See id. at 2063 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In order for a 'vestige' to supply the ground for

an exercise of remedial authority, it must be clearly traceable to the dual school system.").
34. Id. at 2055.
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who work under conditions that approximate those in Kansas City, absent the past history of segregation. The court's benchmark should be
inner-city schools with predominantly black populations without a history of de jure segregation. By that standard, parity in Kansas City may
have been achieved years ago.
But the remedial investments are far more relevant for another reason. Let us suppose that parity by any definition is not achieved. That
failure tells us far more about the impact of additional educational expenditures than it does about the lingering influence of past discrimination within the KCMSD. If those achievement levels continue to lag
behind, then far from increasing expenditures, perhaps one should ask
whether they should be cut back so that money could be released to
other projects where it will yield a greater rate of return. Here the Supreme Court rightly said that the district court had placed far too much
emphasis on national norms in evaluating student achievement. Chief
Justice Rehnquist held that "the District Court should sharply limit, if
not dispense with, its reliance on this factor."3 From a practical point
of view that conclusion surely makes good sense, for it is highly debatable whether the KCMSD will ever achieve test parity. But once again
the response was too tepid. Why keep the door slightly ajar when the
factor could be dispensed with entirely? More importantly, the inability
to articulate standards for deciding when the remedial stage of desegregation litigation is over should warn us off this approach altogether.
Judicial supervision without a benchmark for returning to business as
usual should never be adopted in the first place. The Jenkins litigation's remedial stage should have ended forthwith.
IV
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN DISGUISE

The basic point of this paper is that the desegregation cases have
long since passed the point where they can usefully be described as remedial. Efforts to limit the nature and kinds of remedies are commendable insofar as they curb the imaginations of lower courts, but they are
only half measures relative to the appropriate response. Reconstruction
lasted only twelve years, and then ended. Forty-one years after Brown
the Supreme Court should pull the plug on desegregation litigation and
seek to do the best it can for present students. Some decisive measures
should be taken to dampen the finger-pointing and harm-creation that
inevitably arise once remedial action has been permitted on so intrusive
a level.

35.

Id. (citations omitted).
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There is another way to look at this problem. Earlier I emphasized
that any consultant asked to set a course for the KCMSD would think
about current problems relative to current resources. On those terms, no
one could defend the huge amount of resources poured into one district
at the expense of all others within the state. The official justification for
the expenditure imbalance is the remedial fig-leaf kept alive by the
Court, and once that fig-leaf is removed, the extra expenditures must
stand or fall on their own merits. It is quite clear that they are all made
on a race-conscious basis. It is quite clear that they reduce the total impact of the educational dollar with their skewed impact. If this entire
enterprise cannot sensibly be described as remedial, then it has only cne
name left. It is a form of affirmative action. Can it be justified on those
grounds?
One is hard pressed to explain why such a distribution of benefits
and costs makes sense in this context. The allocations here are not
made according to wealth, and in an odd sense they are only imperfectly made according to race, for there are whites within the KCMSD
who benefit from the program and blacks outside the district who are
hurt by it. As with all affirmative action programs, the fit between
means and ends is far from perfect, and there is always an effort to
cover one's tracks by multiplying purposes and skewing eligibility so
that the "naked" form of the practice no longer exists. But while the
district court's affirmative action program is embedded in an outgrown
remedial context, it shares all the defects of such programs. Because the
basic design is covert, the size and scope of the venture can easily outgrow its usefulness. As is evident in the KCMSD, the size of the budget
is determined by non-political sources, and the returns promised from
these coerced expenditures are speculative at best. I am no fan of the
political process in general, but here, relative to interventionist judges,
the citizens of Missouri and their elected officials will do a much better
job of allocating educational resources than the bench or the bar.
CONCLUSION

In saying this, I do not mean to depart from my view that strong
judicial intervention is necessary to keep legislatures from running
amok.36 I have little patience for the multiple forms of expropriation
that pass under the name of regulation, and I still believe that courts
should keep legislatures in line. But that view never comprehended the
creation of the taxing power in the courts, nor the forced expansion of a
board of education by judicial decree. Rather, the judicial function
should be to insure that all governmental bodies do not overstep their
36.
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limits and engage in extensive acts of redistribution whose overall effect
is to diminish the stock of social wealth. The norms, therefore, that
should be invoked are substantive, with an eye toward reducing the
power and scope of government in all branches, judicial as well as legislative. If large government for redistribution is bad when created by
legislatures and blessed by courts, it is only worse when created by
courts and imposed on legislatures. The question of how to allocate
educational funds is vexing enough if we only concentrate on the future, taking into account the need to contain present discrimination in
the public weal. It is a mistake of constitutional proportions to allow
remote wrongs to justify the unprincipled forms of affirmative action
embedded in an endless web of judicial remediation. It is time to ditch
the courts in the desegregation cases and get on with the future.
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